The control and integration of distributed, multi-sensor per ceptual systems is a complex and challenging problem. The observations or opinions of different sensors are often dis parate, incomparable and are usually only partial views.
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Introduction
The general problem of seeking, sensing, and using percep tual information is a complex and, as yet, unsolved problem.
Complications arise due to inherent uncertainty of informa tion from perceptual sources, . incompleteness of information from partial views, and questions of deployment, coordina tion and fusion of multiple data sources. Yet another dimen sion of complexity results from organizational and compu tational considerations. We feel that these three topicsinformation, control, and organization -are fundamental for understanding and constructing complex, intelligent robotics systems. In this paper, we are concerned with developing useful analytic methods for describing, analyzing and com paring the behavior of such constructions based on these criteria.
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We assume from the outset that such robotic systems are basically task-oriented, goal-directed agents. The be havior of a system is determined entirely by the goal it is working toward, and the information it has about its envi ronment. At any point in time, such an agent should use the available information to select some feasible action. The most preferable action should be that which is expected to lead the system closest to the current goal. In short, we will consider the question of driving robotics systems as a large and complex problem in estimation and control. To adopt the nomenclature of decision theory [2] , at any point in time an agent has a local informalion structure reflecting the state of the world, a set of feasible actions to choose from, and a utility which supplies a preference ordering of actions with respect to states of the world. We generally assume that a rational decision maker is one which, at any point in time, takes that action which maximizes his utility.
Our commitment, as a result of casting the problem in a de cision theoretic perspective, is to provide principled means for specifying information structures, actions, and (perhaps most crucially) determination of utility.
This monolithic formulation is certainly too naive and general to successfully attack the problem. The state of the system is a complex entity which must be decomposed and analyzed to be understood. The resulting procedures for control will undoubtedly be computationally complex. Com puter resources, like human problem solvers, have resource limitations which bound the complexity of problems that can be solved by a single agent -otherwise known as bounded rationality [25] . Such computational considerations suggest distributing the workload to increase the problem solving po tential of the system. From a practical standpoint, the system itself is composed of physically distinct devices, each with its own special characteristics. Software and hardware mod ules should be designed so that information and control local to subtasks is kept locally, and only information germane to other subtasks is made available. Ultimately, sensors and subtasks could independent modules which can be added or removed from a system without catastrophic results. In this case we desire each subtask to have the ability to cooper ate and coordinate its actions with a group while maintaining its own local processing intelligence, local control variables, and possibly some local autonomy.
Our solution is to view the systems as decomposed into several distinct decision-makers. These modules are to be organized and communicate in such a manner as to achieve the common goal of the system. Organizations of this type of are often referred to as teams [8, 16] . We pro pose to consider a team theoretic formulation formulation of multi-sensor systems in the following sense: The agents are considered as members of the team, each observing the environment and making local decisions based on the infor mation available to them. A manager (executive or coor dinator) makes use of utility considerations to converge the opinions of the sensor systems. Section 2 will be devoted to a review of team decision theory and present some new analytic results [7] .
One criticism of decision theory is that optitnal solu tions are often difficult or impossible to find. In order to aid in analysis of these problems, we have built a simula tion environment. We use the simulation to examine various non-optimal and heuristic solutions to otherwise intractable problems, and experiment with different loss functions to de termine the character of the resultant decision method. The simulation is a generalization of classic pursuit and eva sion games [141 to teams of pursuers and evaders. Each team member has local sensors and state variables. They are coordinated through a team executive. Section 3 will be devoted to a detailed look at the simulation and our results to date.
We feel that the team formulation of sensory systems has implications for the broader study of Artificial Intelli gence. AI is relevant to this worlc in at least two respects:
• Firstly, it is certainly possible to consider the agents of the system as performing some reasoning process.
Considering AI systems as decision-makers seems a plausible approach to the construction of intelligent distributed systems. Thus, this work has commonali ties with Distributed AI in that both are interested in questions of structuring information and communica tion between intelligent systems.
• Secondly, we often want to interpret the information available to the system, and to communicate infor mation as interpretations rather than simple signals. This is primarily a problem in representation of infor mation. Again, AI has focussed on the interpretation of information, and the representation of that inter pretation.
More generally, we would like to discover when systems like this can be profitably posed as decision problems. Section 4 will be devoted to an in depth discussion of the general mer its and shortcomings of the organizational view, and attempt to define when it is most appropriate or useful.
A Team-Theoretic Formulation of
Multi-Sensor Systems
Team theory originated from problems in game theory [26] and multi-person control. The basis for the analysis of cooperation amongst structures with different opinions or inter ests was formulated by Nash [20) in the well known bargain ing problem. Nash's solution for the two person cooperative game was developed into the concepts of information, group rationality and multi-person decisions by Savage [24] . Team theory has since been extensively used by economists to an alyze structure [16] , information [18] and communication.
Section 2.1 introduces the team structure and defines the function of the team members and manager. Different team organizations are discussed and the concepts of information structure, team decision, team utility and cooperation are defined in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 applies these techniques to the multi-sensor team and a method for aggregating opin ions is derived. Due to lack of space, we will assume some familiarity with probability and decision theory.1
2.1
Team Preliminaries
A sensor or member of a team of sensors is characterized by its information structure and its decision function. Consider a team comprising of " members or sensors each making observations of the state of the environment. The informa tion structure of the i'" team member is a function 'li which describes the character of the sensor observations z; E Jl; in terms of the state of the environment 8 E 8, and the other sensor actions a.; E A;. j = 1, · · ·, "· So that:
(1) <:;ollectively the n-tuple 11 = ('I;,···, 'In) is called the in formation structure of the team. The action a; of the it " team member is related to its information z; by a decision function 5; E /); as a.; = 5;(z;). We may also allow ran domized rules, in which case 6 associates information with a distribution over the set of feasible actions. Collectively the n-tuple 5 = (51,···, 5n) is called the team decision func tion. R>r an estimation problem, the action space A; is the same as the spac e of possible states of nature 8: Our action is to choose an estimate a.; = 8; E 8 .
There are a number of different forms that the infor mation structure can take which in turn characterizes the type of problem to be solved. If for all team members 'li is defined only on e ('li! e -}I) the resulting structure is called a static team [16] . When 'li also depends on the other team members' actions, then the structure is called a dynamic team (13] . Clearly as each team member can not make decisions and be aware of the result simultaneously, the general form of information structure for a dynamic team must induce a causal relation on the team member actions a ; . We can apply a precedence structure on the time instant a member makes a decision, so that if member i makes a decision prior to member j then the information structure II i will not be a function of a.;. A sensor or member of a team will be considered ratio nal if it can place a·preference ordering on its actions that admits a utility function u; E U. One possible set of ratio nality axioms can be found in [2, p. 43] and the proof that these axioms admit a utility function can be found in [5] . A decision rule 6(·) can be evaluated in terms of its payoff: u ; (6, 8) For example a team member may agree to cooperate and be subject to the utility L, or to disagree with the other team members and be subject to a personal utility. In this case a rational team member will agree to cooperate only if it will gain by doing so: when the team utility exceeds its personal utility. We shall call this an "antagonistic" team. The idea of individual rationality can be extended to include so-called group rationality. Nash first introduced a set of group rationality axioms. There has been consider able disagreement about these axioms [28] , and a number of other definitions have been suggested e.g. [10] . The under lying basis for providing group rationality is the ability of a team to put a preference ordering on group decisions. Un like individual utility considerations, this involves a number of assumptions about the nature of the group or team. For example, each team member must assume some subjective knowledge of other players rationality, interpersonal com parisons of utility require preferences to be congruent and assumptions must be made about indifference, dominance and dictatorship.
Team Organizations
The problems associated with the extension of individual to group rationality are all concerned with the comparison of individual utilities. The existence of a group preference ordering is equivalent to requiring that the combination of individual team member utilities that form the team utility, is convex. If this is satisfied then we say that the group decision is also person-by-person optimal. The key princi ple in group decision making is the idea of Pareto optimal decision rules:
Definition: The group decision 6 • is Pareto-optimal if every other rule 6 E D decreases at least one team members utility.
If the risk set of the team L(8; 61, · · · , 6 n) E R. n is convex, then it can be shown [13] that such a team decision is also person-by-person optimal so that for all team
If the class of group decision rules D includes all jointly randomized rules then L will always be convex. If we re ally believed in an altruistic team, we must use this class and be subject to these results. Considerable work has been done on finding solutions to equation 2.3 under these con ditions [16, 13, 12, 11] , particularly as regards the effect of information structure on distributed control problems.
We are primarily interested in teams of observers-sen sors making observations of the state of the environment. In this case the team members can be considered as Bayesian estimators, and the team decision is to come to a consensus view of the observed state of nature. The static team of esti mators is often called a Multi-Bayesian system [28] . These systems have many of the same characteristics as more gen eral team decision problems. Weerahandi [27] has shown that the set of non-randomized decision rules is not complete in these systems. If two team members using decision rules 
This is the Jensen inequality, and it is well known that this will be satisfi ed if and only if the function L( u( ll)) and the risk set are convex. Generally, this will only be true when the set D of decision rules includes jointly randomized decision rules. Suppose we now restrict group decision rules 6 E D to non-randomized decisions. This allows team members to disagree in the following sense: If the team risk set
is convex for non-randomized 6, then equation 3 holds and a consensus may be reached. If however u is concave in at least one ""• and if randomized rules are disallowed, it is better (in terms of utility) for the associated team members to disagree : as if they were acting as an an antagonistic team. It should be clear from this ex ample that the difference between antagonistic and altruistic teams is the ability to obtain a convex "opinion" space.
If all the U; are convex functions, then L will always be convex on the class of non-randomized decisions. However in location estimation or Multi-Bayesian systems, the u; will often be concave so that L(u) will be guaranteed convex only in the class of randomized rules. Thus L( u) will always be convex for an altruistic team. For an antagonistic team L will only be convex when agreement can be reached (in the class of non-randomized decisions), otherwise if opinions diverge sufficiently then L will be concave. Concavity will generally take the form of separating team members into convex groups of opinions coalitions which may overlap.
Our interest in these results centers on finding when agreement can be reached and in calculating the value of the consensus. We summarize these concepts in the following:
Result 1: Consider a team with member utilities u; (6;19) and team utility satisfying the group rationality conditions. Then:
1.1. Consensus: Cooperation will only occur when the set of risk points L(611 • • • ,6n) E R. n is convex.
Altruistic:
If 6 E [) is the class of all randomized decision rules then L will always be convex.
the class of non-randomized decision rules.
Disagreement:
When L is concave there is no best decision and agreement cannot be reached.
The point at which L becomes concave for each member is called the disagreement point, the value of a member's utility at this point is called the security level.
Multi-Sensor Teams
The fusion of sensor observations requires that we have a method for comparing information from disparate sources.
We consider each sensor to be a member of an antagonistic satisfying the group rationality conditions. If the observations from different sensors are incompa rable, they must be interpreted in some common framework.
This will be the case when the sensors are located in differ ent locations for example. Let D ; interpret S;'s observations in some common description framework. Then the team loss can be written as:
By selecting L and analyzing its convexity, we will establish the character of the sensor team.
The rationality axioms derived from utility theory re quire that we be able to put a preference ordering on deci sions c5i(·). It seems reasonable that the preference ordering admitted by an observation Z; will be the same ordering as that obtained by a maximum likelihood estimator (unbiased Bayes rationality). In this case, the utility function of an observation will be coincident with its likelihood function. For these to be positive, and hence the set u e R.
n to be convex, we are must find a 8 which satisfies:
For all i = 1, · · ·, n observations. Consider any two observations z; and ZJ· They can form a consensus if we can find a 9 that satisfi es equation 
It is clear that a set of observations that satisfy Equation 6 pair-wise will also satisfy Equation 7
In most real situations, it is unlikely that we will know the variance-covariance matrices exactly. In this case, any estimates of the A; act as if they were thresholds in the sense that the larger the A; that is used, the more disagreement will be tolerated.
Simulation Studies
To this point, we have discussed the theoretical aspects of estimation in the team framework. Our goal is to even tually pose problems of multi-sensor control in coordina tion and solve them in a similar manner. However, finding and analyzing solutions to decision, control, or game prob lems, especially in the face of anything less than perfect information, can be extremely difficult. The simulation is constructed so that we can vmy the structure of team members, as well as overall team structure, and quickly evaluate the effects of the change based on the character of the simulated game that ensues. We have in mind to allow variation in such factors as dynamics, sen sors, information integration policies, incentive structures, and uncertainty of information, and observe what types of policies lead to the adequate performance in these circum stances. We expect to transport what we learn from the simulation to real-world problems of multi-sensor robot sys tems currently being developed in the Grasp laboratory[21}.
We imagine a situation where this simulation provides an environment in which distributed expert coordination and control problems can be investigated before implementation and conversely that applications of the sensor systems under development will suggeSl what directions, sensor models and dynamics would most fruitful to explore in the simulation.
The remainder of this section details the current structure of the simulation environment, and outlines our initial experi ences with it.
The Game Environment
The simulation takes place on a planar field possibly littered with obstacles. The basic cycle execution involves team members taking sensor readings, executives integrating in formation and offering incentives, and finally team mem bers making decisions. The state variables are updated and the game moves to a new step. A game terminates when and if the pursuit robots;·which are equipped with a simple ballistics system, capture all the evaders. This is a medium level of granularity with emphasis on the general behavior of teams, not the precise performance issues of team members.
Some time-constraint issues can be investigated by includ ing time parameters in the payoff functions, but computa tional complexity issues and investigations of asynchronous behavior are outside the scope of our considerations. For instance, if some decision policy is computationally more complex than another, differences in performance will not reflect that complexit)'.
The Structure of Team Members
The character of individual team members is determined by three modules: The sensor model we are currently using is a range and direction sensor. The sensor has a limited cone of data gath ering, and a limited range. It has a single control variable a which the robot can select to point the sensor. We as sume that sensors typically return noisy data, so we have different noise models which we "wrap around" the sensor to make it more closely approximate real data gathering de vices. The induces decision problems in dealing with both the noise and range limitations of devices. The fact the the sensors are distributed introduces issues in integrating noisy observations from different frames of reference [6] . Finally, since sensors are transported by the robot, there are issues involved in resolving the conf l icts between action for pur suit or evasion, and actions which will allow more efficient gathering of information.
Termination of the game occurs when all evaders are eliminated. We defi ne a capture re gion which delineates how close a pursuer must come to eliminate an evader.
However, when information is noisy, the area in which the evader can be located will have an associated uncertainty.
We sometimes equip each pursuer with some mechanism to "shoot" evaders, allowing the possibility of uncertainty in observation to make it "miss". Part of the payoff structure of the game can include costs for using projectiles and miss ing; thereby ad di ng incentive to localize the evader to the best degree possible.
Information Structures, Organization, and
Control
The intesting issues are how the robot systems are controlled, The final method uses the executive to integrate infor mation about evaders, and to offer a team incentive to chase a particular evader. But, it also lets team members compute an incentive to avoid obstacles which fall on their path. Fig   ure 2 shows a team configuration where some team members (those labeled "P-D") are disagreeing with the team in order to avoid an obstacle, while the rest of the team (labeled "P A") are following the executives order to chase an evader. This is our first experience with a mix of local and global control.
Our next objective in the simulation is to consider noisy observations and develop sensor control algorithms. Our idea for this project is the following: recall that sensors return distance and direction. We henceforth assume both quantities are distributed according to some probability dis !ribution. The infonnation structure of the team will consist the current best estimate and the information matrix of mea surements integrated as in Section 2. The utility for an angle a; of a sensor i will be the expected change in the informa tion for the closest evader within the cone of vision. This means that individual memben will choose that evader for which they can contribute the "maximum" infonnation. We have not developed any team policies for this scenario, yet.
Evaluation and Speculation
We have considered a very basic, static, non-recursive team slrUcturc for the sensors and cues of a robot system. The results obtained for the aggregation of agent opinions are in tuitively appealing and computationally very simple. Simi larly, the initial simulation experiments with distributed con trol seem promising. However, it is clearly the case that the methods presented thus far could easily be developed with-out recourse to the concepts of team and information struc ture . We have chosen to introduce these ideas for two main reasons: firstly as a device through which the interactions between sensor ag ents may be easily explained, and sec ondly because we feel that team theoretic methodology has great potential for understanding and implementing more complex organizational sttuctures in a systematic manner.
Our main point is that team theory is neither a completely ab stract non-computational formalization of the problem, nor a computational technique or algori!Jtm with no theoreti cal potential, but is in fact our analog of a computational theory [lS] . We assert that the inherent elements of cooper ation and uncertainty make team theory the appropriate tool for this class of problems [ll] . This section discusses the advantages of team theory suggests issues which need to be explored more fully. To this point, we have not discussed uncertainty of in formation. However, information from perceptual sources is sure to have some associated uncertainty. Uncertainty adds an entire dimension to any discussion of information -w e must consider some grade of belief in information [4] and how that should influence the choice of action. In the case of perfect sensing, information is either adequate or inadequate; and new information can be derived by using the constraints of the problem �t hand. Hence, new fa cts will either lead to more information, or be redundant. On the other hand, if information is uncertain, adding more un related observations may not really increase the available information. Multiple correlated observations may, in fa ct, be a better strategy since that is likely to reduce uncertainty. what" information structure. In general, not all the informaOne area which needs more exploration is a methodol tion about a robotics system is relevant to the construction ogy for the specifi cation of loss functions. Ideally, the loss of specific portions of the system. Analogously, all the in-fu nction should be justifiable in terms of objective criteria fo rmation available via sensors is not relevant to the perforrelated to the problem. Pragmatically, it is often dictated by mance of all parts of the system. In the example above, the mathematical convenience. To illustrate what we have in mind, consider formulat ing loss functions for controlling a system based on a desired state of information. That is, if the team has its goal some state of information (for example, to move an arm this in formation is needed), what action is most appropriate for progressing from the current information state toward the desired information state. Should it select an action which will change the uncertainty associated with current infor mation, or go ahead with an action that adds uncorrelated evidence? How should it decide that it has enough infor mation? More concretely, should the executive take another picture with the camera, or perhaps take a different view, or maybe use another sensor altogether. Maybe the sensors themselves should decide individually what to do. These are all issues dealing with the interaction of information and action. By using team theory, we can easily formulate the problem, specify loss functions or decision methods based on, for example, the parameters of a probability distribution associated with some information source, and examine the results via simulation or by analytic methods.
Information and Structure
Decision Theory and AI
As we stated at the outset, we consider our work relevant to AI in that we that we may want to consider information as interpreted, and would like to consider parts of a system as intelligent reasoning agents. In related work dealing with the interaction of intelligent agents, Rosenschein and Genesereth in [22] and Ginsburg in [9] have investigated variations on game theoretical definitions of rationality for coordinating intelligent agents. However these results are an attempt to analyze the interaction of intelligent agents with no a priori structure and investigate the consequence of various ratio nality assumptions. We , on the other hand, postulate a given team structure and are interested in discovering its proper ties. This is an important fundamental distinction to keep in mind. It is our view that knowledge-based reasoning agents can be used effectively in the team theoretic framework; but, we must be able to describe them in terms of the other systems elements -that is, as decision makers with infor mation structures and preferences about action. In order to achieve this objective, we must develop information struc tures to be compatible with AI conceptions of information as discrete (usually logical) tokens, and so�ehow connect control structures and loss formulations. At his point, we can sketch at least possibility. First, view such reasoning agents as consisting of two phases: computing the informa tion structure, and selecting an optimal action in the face of available information. This is similar to the classic separa tion of estimation in control in control theory literature [3] . Computation of the information structure amounts to using fu rnished information and making implicit information explicit relative to a given model [23] . That is, some part of the information in the knowledge base is used to infer new facts from given information. The complete set of such facts form (in a limiting sense) the information structure. Some of the theoretical analyses of (logical) knowledge have de tailed methods for describing this process of inference using variants of modal logic [23] .
Loss formulations for the preference of actions can be specified using a conception of action similar to the situation calculus [17, 19] . In this system, action is a mapping between world states, where each state represents a configuration of the world. Moore [19] has shown how both information and action can be represented and related within the conceptual framework of world states, making loss formu lations based on information possible. The actual details of this procedure are beyond the scope of this paper, but we can show that several problems in the planning domain can, in fact, be reduced to decision problems posed in this manner. As a further example, consider building a decision-maker who attempts to fill in gaps in an incomplete, discrete knowledge base. The specification of information and loss functions can be done in terms of world states as presented above, and the actual implementation of the system done as a rule-based system.
Finally, we may attempt to combine this agent with agents which attempt to reduce uncertainty in the probabilis tic sense outlined in the previous subsection. For instance, a camera and a tactile sensor which have local probabilistic uncertainty reduction methods, and a global executive which is building models of the environment. Using team theory, we can analyze possible methods for control and cooperation of these disparate agents and offer a coherent explanation of the full system's behavior.
Conclusions and Future Research
Analysis of the general team organization with re spect to team members information structures provides a systematic framework for addressing a number of important questions concerning the effect of sensor agent capabilities on over all system performance. We summarize some of the more important issues:
1. Could sensor benefit by guidance from another team member. Should communication between members be increased.
2. Should the sensors ability to make observations be enhanced in anyway, by changing hardware or fi nding algorithmic bottlenecks.
3. When would an exchange of opinions and dynamic consensus be attemp ted .
4.
What overall system structure (as described by the information structures of the team members) is best (or better) for different tasks. 3. Effects of new decision heuristics on overall system performan ce.
Of course all these ideas may well be difficult to consider analytically, though this formalism does reduce the search space of alternatives and provides a framework within which these issues may be evaluated. The team theoretic organiza tion is a powerful method for analyzing multi-agent systems, but it is certainly not the complete answer.
